Latest From Iraq: Stats in Doubt, Reconciliation is Dead, The Army is Exhausted, Mercenaries Are Scum + More

There's a lot on my plate today in terms of interesting articles and news to share.

So lets begin where so much of my attention seems to always be in - Iraq

Iraq

So how are things going in Iraq these days? The 'Surge' is in full force and we're supposed to be creating an environment for political reconciliation to occur...is it? A relevant question to ask given that the whole purpose of this much debated 'Surge' was to bring about just such progress.

According to the Washington Post (Oct. 8), Iraqi's do not think reconciliation is attainable and are instead preparing for a power struggle

For much of this year, the U.S. military strategy in Iraq has sought to reduce violence so that politicians could bring about national reconciliation, but several top Iraqi leaders say they have lost faith in that broad goal.

Iraqi leaders argue that sectarian animosity is entrenched in the structure of their government. Instead of reconciliation, they now stress alternative and perhaps more attainable goals: streamlining the government bureaucracy, placing experienced technocrats in positions of authority and improving the dismal record of providing basic services.

"I don't think there is something called reconciliation, and there will be no reconciliation as such," said Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd. "To me, it is a very inaccurate term. This is a struggle about power."

Humam Hamoudi, a prominent Shiite cleric and parliament member, said any future reconciliation would emerge naturally from an efficient, fair government, not through short-term political engineering among Sunnis and Shiites.

Stacking the government with technocrats (who are though of nonpartisan experts in their field) might be a good idea but where are they going to find these experts when so many of the great minds of Iraq have fled the carnage of post-Saddam Iraq? Those with the experience and skills and education have been pouring out of Iraq, so there is but one problem.

Second, how are they going to choose these people and how will they be accepted by rival groups in the context of a power struggle?

As to what a future reconciliation emerging from "an efficient, fair government" I ask: How the hell do you expect an efficient and fair government to emerge out of a power struggle? Because, in power struggle someone is usually a winner and another a loser (relatively) and the winners definition of what is fair may not exactly coincide with what the loser thinks is a fair government. In fact that's a lot of the problem Iraqi groups are facing today.

Sunnis see their relative power in Iraq being too low in the Central government and they see the the Shia as dominating the government. So far the Shias have been pretty stingy with the power, no doubt a result of the anger and resentment they harbor against the Sunnis who where the dominant group in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

Any compromise or reconciliation will require an efficient and fair government to emerge but it almost inevitably (at least it seems so to me) means that the Shia will need to give up some of the grip they have on the Iraqi central government in order for the Sunnis to really play ball. I'm not too optimistic about that fact but you never know.

The following excerpt makes the same point:

"I, as deputy prime minister responsible for the portfolio of security and services, until now, have never been consulted on any security operation taking place in Iraq," said Salam Z. al-Zobaee, Iraq's second-highest Sunni official. "The Sunnis, even if they've been participating in the government, are still marginalized in decision-making."

The idea of "reconciliation" in Iraq has always been short on specifics. To Sunnis, it tends to mean Shiites will release their grip on decision-making, allow them greater influence in the government, crack down on militants regardless of their sect and promote peaceful cooperation between politicians. Sunnis demand the release of thousands of prisoners who have never been charged, the purging of all militiamen from the Iraqi security forces and influence in military decisions.

To Shiites, reconciliation is a process fraught with risks that Sunni "supremacists" will attempt to seize their former position of authority over the majority Shiites. Many Shiites believe that reconciliation requires punishing those who, during Saddam Hussein's government, ruthlessly killed and repressed Shiites and Kurds.

"It's clearly perceived by the government that reconciliation is clearly a winner for the Sunnis and not a winner for the Shias," said Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson, chief of staff for the second-ranking U.S. commander in Iraq. "The question becomes: How do you start balancing that scale a little bit?"

Many Shiites, still aggrieved by the crimes committed against them under Hussein, are not ready for new programs or legislation attempting to force a balance into existence.

And that's the problem. When do you think non partisan technocrats will be put in when Shias are not really interested in the system being fairer to Sunnis out of fear and resentment for past mistreatment?

Not to mention that "reconciliation" means very different things to the two groups...it leaves little to be optimistic about.
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Making things worse for the already chaotic situation in Iraq is the fact that there is so much internal displacement of Iraqi's [Iraqis forced to leave their homes and reside in other Iraqi provinces].

A travesty on its own that seems to be further fragmenting up Iraq and feeding new recruits to the violent sectarian groups (BBC)

The scale of the overall displacement is unprecedented in the modern history of the Middle East.

There are now an estimated four million Iraqis who have been forced to flee their homes, and the numbers continue to rise, according to the UN refugee agency.

Neighbouring Jordan and Syria, which have borne the brunt of the problem after receiving some two million refugees over the past few years, have now restricted access because they can no longer cope with the influx.(snip)

The refugee problem is also likely to make national reconciliation even more difficult to achieve.

'Recruiting-grounds'

Ghaith Abdul Ahad, an Iraqi journalist, says the areas where displaced Iraqis live have become fertile recruiting-grounds for militants.

"The insurgents in west Baghdad tell me that the hardest fighters are the Sunnis who have been kicked out of their homes by the Shia," Mr Abdul Ahad told the BBC.

There is a real fear that the temporary ramshackle refugee camps that today dot the Iraqi landscape are festering wounds that may take years to heal.

More ominously, they are a breeding ground for violence as well as social and political turmoil.

Outside Iraq, the long-term effect of the exodus is difficult to foresee.

Some analysts have drawn comparisons with the plight of the Palestinians, who were forced to flee after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

And if that analogy is anything to go by, then the Iraqi refugee crisis could become a destabilising factor for the entire region for years to come.

No one can predict the exact impact on the precarious demographic balance in neighbouring Syria and Jordan, which have received the highest numbers of Iraqi refugees.

Insurgencies by their nature require a steady flow of new recruits in order to remain viable due to the very violent nature and high "turnover" of insurgents [yes, that is a euphemism for death]. The cleansing of neighborhoods [making them only 1 sectarian group or another] has created much resentment and anger and resentment and anger are two commodities that have been all to abundant in Iraq.

And notice the unintended consequences of our invasion: We are saddling neighboring Arab nations with millions and millions of Iraqi refugees. The effects of such a large refugee groups in those nations could prove quite bad. The article says it may have a destabilizing influence on the Middle East region in general and that doesn't seem a far-fetched conclusion.

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And, speaking of insurgents, we get this news that can't be making the US or the Iraqi (Shia dominated govt) too happy.

Iraq Insurgent Groups Form One Council - In reality there are still many groups like the 1920 Brigades who are independent, but even then there appears to generally be a 3-fold split in the Sunni groups.

1) Sunni insurgent groups working with al-Qaeda to attack Americans
2) Sunni insurgent groups (or formerly insurgent), and Sunni tribes working with Americans (temporarily they promise) to attack al-Qaeda
3) Sunni insurgents coalition (like the one in the above link) that want to attack the US and Al-Qaeda

2 out of 3 attack Americans, and the 1 that does not, has already promised to resume attacking Americans once al-Qaeda has been dealt with...none of that is good news for the US in the long term.

Excerpt:

Six main Iraqi insurgent groups announced the formation of a "political council" aimed at "liberating" Iraq from U.S. occupation in a video aired Thursday on Al-Jazeera television.

The council appeared to be a new attempt to assert the leadership of the groups, which have moved to distance themselves from another coalition of insurgent factions led by al-Qaida in Iraq...(snip)

The new groups principles include:

"First, the occupation is an oppression and aggression, rejected by Islamic Sharia law and tradition. Resistance of occupation is a right guaranteed by all religions and laws," he said. "Second, the armed resistance ... is the legitimate representative of Iraq. It is the one that bears responsibility for the leadership of the people to achieve its legitimate hope."

The groups forming the council include the Islamic Army of Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, Ansar al-Sunna, the Fatiheen Army, the Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance (Jami) and the Islamic Movement of Hamas-Iraq.

The step could be a bid by the insurgents for a more cohesive political voice at a time of considerable rearrangement among Sunni insurgent groups and Iraq's Sunni Arab minority.

This group, nor the Sunni group working with al-Qaeda in Iraq, nor the the Sunni group working with the Americas believes in the legitimacy of the Shia dominated central government in Iraq. They are the "legitimate representatives of Iraq."

Some look to the downturn in violence in al-Anbar Province as a sign of progress but if you look more critically and deeper you understand how the "Anbar model" is very dangerous and counterproductive. I went into that in more depth in a past post from September 19

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The US Army Iraq Exhaustion

According to the Army Chief, the Army will require 3 to 4 years to recover from the strains that the Iraq mission has placed on it.

That's 3 or 4 years in which the US will not be as prepared or ready to deal with other threats or crisis as they pop up in the coming years. The Iraq mission imperils our national security in so many ways that it baffles the mind.

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General Petraeus and Iraq Statistics

The NY Times Public Editor recently tackled the issue of the frustrating difference in Iraq violence statistics

Definitely something worth reading, but this stood out. Greg Sargent of the Horses Mouth explains:

Specifically, Hoyt reports that he spoke to one of Petraeus' own advisers, and despite having advised Petraeus he still says that the General's recent testimony to Congress about Iraq may have been misleading in key ways:

Stephen Biddle, a scholar at the nonpartisan Council on Foreign Relations, said Petraeus's December number was "very high" but was likely the result of "statistical noise" — the tendency of Iraq numbers to jump all over the place. Biddle was an adviser to Petraeus last spring but believes the general's testimony was "potentially misleading" because it didn't discuss all the reasons why the numbers might have improved.

He said the best way to analyze statistics from Iraq is to gather all the numbers from all sources and look for broad trends instead of picking isolated points, as Petraeus did. Biddle examined data from nine sources on Iraqi civilian deaths, including the U.S. military, independent organizations like Brookings and Iraq Body Count and four news organizations. Although the specific monthly numbers varied widely, he said they all showed declines since late 2006.

Did we know that even one of Petraeus' own advisers thinks the General's methodology was suspect? I didn't know it...(snip)

Seems like a subject that deserves some further inquiry. After all, a member of Petraeus' informal brain-trust has now said publicly that the General's testimony was "potentially misleading." And he suggested that it could have been misleading in not one, but two ways. First, because it didn't delve into all the reasons for the shifting security picture in Iraq, thus giving more credit to the surge than it might have deserved. And second, because Petraeus selected December 2006, when civilian casualties spiked, as the basis for comparison to this summer's numbers, thus inflating the alleged decline. Those seem like serious critiques.

Nothing really to add to that except to say that its still a little apples-and-oranges to compare violence statistics from December 2006 to September2007. Comparing them on a year by year comparison from the same time of year [comparing July 2006 to July 2007 for example] is a much better measure for various reasons I don't want to get into again.

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Unaccountable, Arrogant Mercenaries in Iraq

Blackwater Mercenaries are definitely no friends to US soldiers and nothing but trouble for the mission in Iraq. This personally pissed me off when I read it:

The colonel was furious. "Can you believe it? They actually drew their weapons on U.S. soldiers." He was describing a 2006 car accident, in which an SUV full of Blackwater operatives had crashed into a U.S. Army Humvee on a street in Baghdad's Green Zone. The colonel, who was involved in a follow-up investigation and spoke on the condition he not be named, said the Blackwater guards disarmed the U.S. Army soldiers and made them lie on the ground at gunpoint until they could disentangle the SUV.

The fucking gall of these arrogant ass mercs!! Who the hell do they think they are!! Not only do they lord it over and treat Iraqi's like shit (and often target practice), but they are so arrogant and think themselves so unaccountable that they feel like they can treat U.S. Soldiers like pieces of shit too!!

Whatever else Blackwater is or isn't guilty of—a topic of intense interest in Washington—it has a well-earned reputation in Iraq for arrogance and high-handedness. Iraqis naturally have the most serious complaints; dozens have been killed by Blackwater operatives since the beginning of the war. But many American civilian and military officials in Iraq also have little sympathy for the private security company and its highly paid employees.

These scum think they own the place, feel free to treat Iraqi and US soldier alike like crap, and to top it off its not abnormal for these mercenaries to get paid in the $100,000 to $200,000 range just to do the job that the US military is supposed to be doing.

But the Bush administration, as with every other thing, likes to privatize everything it touches including much of the US military's traditional duties, and give private security firms (often with close connections to the White House or Republican groups...coincidence?) a shitload of money from us tax payers.

To make matters worse, these mercs treat Iraqi's like shit, and further tarnish the image of the US in Iraq, and undercut its goal of reaching hearts and minds in Iraq...in other words they hurt our mission in Iraq while costing US taxpayers a fucking fortune in the process!! Then they disrespect our soldiers on a daily basis.

Scum.

I try not an curse so much in my posts but...I reeeeeally don't like these mercenaries.

That's all for today, and I'm still didn't even get to Turkey and its threats to invade northern Iraq (what a thing to leave out!!)...tomorrow I guess.