"The Economic Consequences of Mr. Bush" (and short roundup)

I came across this piece in Vanity Fair written by renowned Nobel Laureate (and I believe former World Bank or IMF President..not sure) Joseph Stiglitz where he argues that the economic and other damage wrought by this president surpass, and his stewardship of the economy is worse even than Herbert Hoover. [Herbert Hoover being the president at the start of the Great Depression]

Please. Read. This.

Here are some excerpts:

When we look back someday at the catastrophe that was the Bush administration, we will think of many things: the tragedy of the Iraq war, the shame of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, the erosion of civil liberties. The damage done to the American economy does not make front-page headlines every day, but the repercussions will be felt beyond the lifetime of anyone reading this page.

I can hear an irritated counterthrust already. The president has not driven the United States into a recession during his almost seven years in office. Unemployment stands at a respectable 4.6 percent. Well, fine. But the other side of the ledger groans with distress: a tax code that has become hideously biased in favor of the rich; a national debt that will probably have grown 70 percent by the time this president leaves Washington; a swelling cascade of mortgage defaults; a record near-$850 billion trade deficit; oil prices that are higher than they have ever been; and a dollar so weak that for an American to buy a cup of coffee in London or Paris—or even the Yukon—becomes a venture in high finance...(snip)

Up to now, the conventional wisdom has been that Herbert Hoover, whose policies aggravated the Great Depression, is the odds-on claimant for the mantle “worst president” when it comes to stewardship of the American economy. Once Franklin Roosevelt assumed office and reversed Hoover’s policies, the country began to recover. The economic effects of Bush’s presidency are more insidious than those of Hoover, harder to reverse, and likely to be longer-lasting. There is no threat of America’s being displaced from its position as the world’s richest economy. But our grandchildren will still be living with, and struggling with, the economic consequences of Mr. Bush...(snip)

On the tax cuts...

But the Bush administration had its own ideas. The first major economic initiative pursued by the president was a massive tax cut for the rich, enacted in June of 2001. Those with incomes over a million got a tax cut of $18,000—more than 30 times larger than the cut received by the average American. The inequities were compounded by a second tax cut, in 2003, this one skewed even more heavily toward the rich. Together these tax cuts, when fully implemented and if made permanent, mean that in 2012 the average reduction for an American in the bottom 20 percent will be a scant $45, while those with incomes of more than $1 million will see their tax bills reduced by an average of $162,000.

The administration crows that the economy grew—by some 16 percent—during its first six years, but the growth helped mainly people who had no need of any help, and failed to help those who need plenty. A rising tide lifted all yachts. Inequality is now widening in America, and at a rate not seen in three-quarters of a century. A young male in his 30s today has an income, adjusted for inflation, that is 12 percent less than what his father was making 30 years ago. Some 5.3 million more Americans are living in poverty now than were living in poverty when Bush became president. America’s class structure may not have arrived there yet, but it’s heading in the direction of Brazil’s and Mexico’s.

He deals with the Bankruptcy and mortgage mess, Iraq, oil and gas prices, our image internationally, our messed up trade policies and more. It is a real good read although it really does bring home just how much the next few President's and Congresses will have to work just to fix the damage of this man's stewarship.

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In a previous post ("Calm Before the Storm..") on tuesday, I noted that the US was in big trouble in the near future as it came to face some problems that are currently under the surface:

The US is in for a big shock when those groups that they are arming (al-Sahwa people) suddenly turn their guns on them, just as those just mentioned above (anti-US and AQI currently, but regrouping) also resume attacks on US soldiers and on the Shia government and people.

Matters will further get worse whenever Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr decides to end his ceasefire (and he will) and resume his attacks on Sunnis and on Americans.

No, this is not progress. This is not progress at all...

A triple wammy that will quickly end the relative (and it really is just relative) "quiet" in Iraq recently.

Number 3 on that list was Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Militia. He currently has declared a cease-fire, but it is obviously temporary and self-serving.

All we have to do is look back to 2004 when he last declared a ceasefire to see how that worked out.

Back then a ceasefire was called to allow time for the militia to regroup, recoup, rearm, and reorganize in a manner that will allow for greater control and loytalty to al-Sadr. Also a break to better train themselves into more effective fighters.

As many as 80 Iranian agents are working with an estimated 500 Sadr militiamen, known as the Mahdi Army, providing training and nine 57-mm Russian antiaircraft guns to add to stocks of mortars, antitank weapons, and other armaments, according to Iraqi and US intelligence reports.

"They are preparing for something, gathering weapons; people are coming in buses from other parts of Iraq," says Michael al-Zurufi, the Iraqi security adviser of Najaf Province. "The most important are the Iran- ians. The Iranian people are trying to reorganize Sadr's militia so they can fight again."

At the same time, heavily armed Sadr militiamen are waging fear tactics, kidnapping local Iraqi police and family members, occupying buildings, and arresting Iraqis deemed critical of Sadr or in violation of Islamic law, residents and officials say.

Signs that the Sadr militia is regrouping after heavy losses in April and May come even as Iraqi leaders are attempting to nudge the firebrand cleric into the political arena.

There is reason to be skeptical about the current ceasfire...and when that ends.

It'll be a disaster by itself, but it will be a bloodbath if the "al-Sahwa" Sunnis and the anti-US Sunnis join in...

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"Not us. We're not going" - Troop unity, and morale are suffering in Iraq. A disturbing story about one such "mutiny"

The Calm Before the Storm..

So, I guess I've been lagging ALOT on the blogging lately, which is bad considering the interesting developments out there (Iran NIE, CIA destruction of videotapes showing "enhanced interrogations i.e. torture)

What I'm going to do is get rid of all the things on my computer:

So first, I'll deal with Iraq matters

Next, with that done, I want to do a roundup-type piece within the next couple days devoted exclusively to the Iran National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that undercut the Administrations case for war. So far I have like 5 or six links related to that, although it could increase by the time I write something up.

It's a little late, but it could still prove useful to people who aren't TV news, or online news junkies like me. :)

Ok, lets begin

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Iraq - Fear of a Growing Sunni Militia

The al-Anbar province has seen a marked decline in violence as more an more Sunni sheiks, and former insurgent groups -- temporarily -- cooperate with the US in order to rid themselves of the Sunni foreign fighters of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

This temporary state of affairs, along with the decision by powerful Shia militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr to unilaterally declare a ceasefire has accounted for most of the drop in violence seen in Iraq recently.

Ignorant types, or those who see it in their political interest to say so, point to the US Surge as the reason for the improving situation, but it really is quite ridiculous.

It completely ignores the previously mentioned factors and what's more it assigns the cause for the reduction in violence to a surge of only 30,000 extra troops -- most located within the Baghdad area. Leaving us to wonder how these extra troops could have pacified regions they are not even in...you'd think someone would think to ask.

Others also like to point to the "Al-Anbar Model" and the "Al-Anbar Awakening" -- which is a reason for the reduction in violence in the Sunni region of al-Anbar -- as a positive sign for Iraq.

That is conclusion that I seriously disagreed with, as demonstrated in these two blog posts from September19th and December 3rd.

Long story short: It sacrifices long and medium turn security, for short terms gains which not only are likely to be temporary, but have yet to foster the political progress that it was supposed to. In fact, it has actually added fire to the sectarian hatred an animosity that fuels the Iraqi civil war, and empowered a Sunni militia in Anbar that threatens the stability and power of the Shia-dominated Iraqi Central government in Baghdad, thus undercutting the goal of fostering Iraqi unity.

And the Shia's in the central government are definitely worried about the growing Sunni might that the US is helping to foster in al-Anbar as part of it "al-Anbar" model.

The American campaign to turn Sunni Muslims against Islamic extremists is growing so quickly that Iraq's Shiite Muslim leaders fear that it's out of control and threatens to create a potent armed force that will turn against the government one day...

But that hasn't calmed mounting concerns among aides to Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who charge that some of the groups include "terrorists" who attack Shiite residents in their neighborhoods. Some of the new "concerned citizens" are occupying houses that terrified Shiite families abandoned, they said.

It also hasn't quieted criticism that the program is trading long-term Iraqi stability for short-term security gains.

"There is a danger here that we are going to have armed all three sides: the Kurds in the north, the Shiite and now the Sunni militias," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst who's now at The Brookings Institution, a center-left policy organization in Washington, D.C.

In my view they have a legitimate concern. Iraqi Sunnis are highly suspicious of the central government who they see dominated and controlled by Iraq's Shias. They see the Iraqi central government as under the grip of the Shias, who stubbornly refuse to deal with Iraqi Sunnis and give them more real political power and influence in the central government.

The Shia's certainly have a troubled history of subjugation by the minority Sunnis which is the root of all the mistrust of giving Sunnis power, but I see little way to resolve the situation unless the Shia's relax some of their grip on power in the central government. Jeez, I went on an unrelated tangent there...

Anyways, as I was saying, the Shia-dominated central government is fearful of the rising strenght and organization of the Sunni militias that the US is helping to foster.

But the US and the central government have addition problems:

We already know that the Sunni groups currently working with the US to rid AQI from Anbar are only doing so on a temporary basis -- vowing to resume fighting Americans when the job is done --

Further evidence of the shortsightedness of the "Anbar Model" is provided in the following news items which explains how Sunni insurgent groups have deliberately scaled back attacks on US troops in order to regroup and retrain for when the extra troops finally leave Baghdad.

Iraq's main Sunni-led resistance groups have scaled back their attacks on US forces in Baghdad and parts of Anbar province in a deliberate strategy aimed at regrouping, retraining, and waiting out George Bush's "surge", a key insurgent leader has told the Guardian.

US officials recently reported a 55% drop in attacks across Iraq. One explanation they give is the presence of 30,000 extra US troops deployed this summer. The other is the decision by dozens of Sunni tribal leaders to accept money and weapons from the Americans in return for confronting al-Qaida militants who attack civilians. They call their movement al-Sahwa (the Awakening).

The resistance groups are another factor in the complex equation in Iraq's Sunni areas. "We oppose al-Qaida as well as al-Sahwa," the director of the political department of the 1920 Revolution Brigades told the Guardian in Damascus in a rare interview with a western reporter.

The US is in for a big shock when those groups that they are arming (al-Sahawa people) suddenly turn their guns on them, just as those just mentioned above (anti-US and AQI currently, but regrouping) also resume attacks on US soldiers and on the Shia government and people.

Matters will further get worse whenever Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr decides to end his ceasefire (and he will) and resume his attacks on Sunnis and on Americans.

No, this is not progress. This is not progress at all...

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Roundup

South America launches new bank to rival the International Monetary Fund - Interesting move by the various South American nations. Certainly the IMF and its strict loan conditions have caused problems in the borrower countries often enough...I can see where the desire for an alternative comes from. Not exactly my cup of tea...I'd sure love to hear what my old International Political Economy professor would have to say on this.

Tom Tancredo Hires Illegal Laborers to Renovate His Mansion - Rabid anti-immigrant personality Tom Tancredo has problems practicing what he preaches. Smell that hypocrisy...

That's all for tonight. I'll get on that Iran NIE post sometime in the next couple days.

Goodnight.

The 'al-Anbar Awakening'...sounds fancy doesn't it?

Since the testimony of the Petraeus/White House Report on the Surge beginning Sept. 10th two things have proven true about Iraq:

1) At the very least [and I'm leaning towards cherry picking positive data and ignoring negative stats]....the data is often contradictory about civilian and sectarian deaths in Iraq. That's at the very least. Of course that is me being 5 times more generous than I should be because data from all independent sources, from sources with no vested interest in painting a rosy story, tell us that sectarian and civilian deaths nationwide are trending at nearly the same levels, or sometime a little higher.

2) In the al-Anbar Province region [in yellow] of Iraq there has seen a noticeable reduction in violence. The reason for this lies in the fact that some Sunni sheiks and tribal leaders, and formerly insurgent groups attacking American soldiers have decided to instead work with us against their former allies the Sunni group al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Surge Progress?
This fact has been touted by war supporters and by some generally ignorant commentators as a clear case of progress for the Surge.

They look at Anbar Province and they see a way of scrapping some success (somehow) from the jaws of defeat.

But the question is: Is this policy good for Iraq? Is this progress?

Dousing The Raging Fires Of Civil War...With Gasoline?
This policy involves the US collaborating with groups who formerly were heavily involved in attacks on US troops not that long ago.

Why the change you might ask? Why are Sunni insurgent groups formerly at odd with us, suddenly eager to work with us against al-Qaeda in Iraq?

Simple: While nobody in Iraq [neither Kurd, Shia, nor even Sunni] liked the Sunni foreign fighters, among the Sunni insurgency a marriage of convenience was made with them in order to deal with what was perceived as the greater evil and threat; The United States.

Many insurgent groups have changed their mind and are making another marriage of convenience [this time with the Americans] in order to eliminate al-Qaeda who they now see as a bigger pest.

Good news for the US and for Iraq right?

Wrong...so horribly wrong.

3 Reasons This Is Wrong And/Or Dangerous

1) We are arming groups (or at the very least giving them money that they use to buy arms) that promise to turn those guns on us once they finish with al-Qaeda in Iraq.

You see, the problem with enemy-of-my-enemy marriages of conveniences is that they are good until, well...it's no longer convenient. The Sunni insurgency already has the American's number. They are well seasoned in how to attack American's. But now they want to get rid of AQI and know the US will provide them the arms and funding to do so.

But these groups have promised [in public no less] to resume attacks on US soldiers once they have finished dealing a sufficient blow on AQI.

One Sunni insurgent leader - Abu Ali - said this US assistance:

Publicly, Abu Ali is grateful for the assistance he and his followers have received from the U.S. military. He predicts he can help clear the entire province of al Qaeda militants within six months if the U.S. Army provides more ammunition and supports insurgent operations with air cover and help from tanks and armored personnel carriers.

But while the marriage of convenience may be successful for now, Abu Ali and his followers seem to have no intention of making a lasting commitment to the Americans.

"After we are done with al Qaeda," Abu Ali says, "we will ask the Americans to withdraw from Iraq. ... If they do not withdraw, there will be violations and the American army will be harmed."

Meaning once they are done with AQI, they will have no need for our cooperation. In other words: We are arming and funding the very groups who will use those very weapons we provided to attack US soldiers in the future. We are being used...

But that's not the worst part of this policy

2) If feeds the specter of full-scale civil war by arming and funding different and competing sides in a civil and ethnic conflict.

The Sunnis in Anbar, or anywhere in Iraq, do not trust or want the Shia-dominated [and US supported] government in Baghdad. They want nothing to do with it.

By funding and arming the Sunni insurgent groups in al-Anbar Province they are effectively funding and arming a rival to the government in Baghdad. The US has propped up and helped the Government in Baghdad, and now is undercutting it by funding and empowering a rival in Anbar province. In essence fueling multiple sides in any civil war. That is counter productive towards the goal of Iraqi unity, and makes it less likely that the central government can exercise any control over all of Iraq outside Shia regions, and even that might not be true (I'll explain in the Roundup). The US is ensuring that Iraq will break into a Sunni region, a Kurdish region in the north, and Shia region in the center and south...and these groups will fight it out in full-scale bloodbath once the US leaves. We should NOT make the bloodbath any worse than its going to be.

The Shias and Kurds are not happy needless to say.


We are pouring gasoline on a fire that was already blazing.

And one of the most frustrating part about this policy is #3

3) It is a totally unneccesary policy if the stated goal is to eliminate AQI and prevent it from taking over Iraq.

First, it is sheer fantasy to believe AQI could ever take over Iraq. It numbers from 1500- 3500 members, which is very small considering that the Sunni insurgency overall is estimated to consist of 25,000 members. They are particularly lethal minority but they simply don't have the numbers to take over even 1 province in Iraq.

Second, the Kurds in the north, and the much more numerous Shia would never allow the Sunni AQI to have a real stronghold in Iraq.

But that's not really the frustrating thing

The most frustrating part is that the only factor that keeps some insurgent groups in league with AQI (and even then many have turned against them) is the US presence in Iraq. Not only does our presence motivate AQI to be in Iraq, it is the reason many Sunni insurgents have (and some continue to) work with AQI.

If we were to leave, there would be no incentive for anyone in Iraq to shelter AQI...they'd most likely be eliminated quite quickly. And in the unlikely case that the Sunnis made another marriage of convenience with AQI to fight the Shias in the full-scale civil war that would follow our exit...well, lets be real. There is NO doubt about who will be the winner...the Shias who are numerically superior.

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No Happy Ending Here

Sad isn't it? The US is preventing a full-scale civil war with its presence in one respect, pouring gasoline on it in another respect, but all it can do is delay the eventuality of that war.

If it leaves it will be a bloodbath, if it stays its a smaller bloodbath. But it cannot seem to change that eventuality...But in the meantime, every day it stays in Iraq delaying that war, we lose precious lives, untold billions of money, push our military that much closer to collapse, make us vulnerable to other emerging threats, and hinders our ability to deal with other threats and crisis around the world.

There are no good solutions or policies for the US or Iraq that will ensure anything but some level of violence. But we must leave because that is what is best for the US.

But...it's not fair.

We invaded their country, we destroyed their infrastructure, we messed up the occupation, we allowed the country to go to hell, and now we are going to leave them to a bloody civil war.

It's not fair. Its not fair...

But this is necessary for the United States and ultimately that is who I will think of first. It is not the fault of those who want us to withdraw (many who never wanted us to enter Iraq in the first place), ultimately it is the fault of those who took us to war, and then compounded that initial mistake with a bungled occupation.

Yet I still feel guilty. I suppose, as Americans, we all share blame for the blood shed in Iraq up until now, and for the blood that will be shed when we leave.

You don't understand...I want the US, I want Bush (no matter how much I hate the guy) to pull off a victory, to pull off some miracle that brings the Iraqi's together or at least prevents a bloodbath.

I don't write about my doubts with the Iraq strategy out of some wish to see him fail, I write it because its what I see, and I wont BS you guys out of wishful thinking for a better outcome for Iraqis.

We had an Administration who was and continues to be delusional in all things Iraq and were the masters of wishful thinking, and wishful planning...there is no need for me to add to that delusion if it is not warranted.

-----Roundup------

Expulsion of American Security firms could jeopardize withdrawal plans - Its talking about the withdrawal of the 30,000 Surge troops that Bush recently said could come home by next summer. Why is it in doubt? Because the US relies heavily on "private contractors" in Iraq, otherwise know by its more well know name: mercenaries. Paid-soldier, guns-for-hire etc...

In fact, mercenaries outnumber US troops in Iraq...bet you didn't know that!! (We have 160,000 US troops there right now just as a FYI)

And these mercs are unaccountable to the Iraqi govt or the US government. These aggressive mercs frequently kill civilians and inflame the population, thus making the job that much harder for US soldiers. Everyone, even US soldiers, hate their guts but given the combat troop shortage, its been the US only recourse to keep the occupation going. Iraqi's especially hate their guts.

But now that prominent mercenary company Blackwater might get booted out, it might make it difficult for the US to withdraw those surge troops. With 15 months tours already, I'm not sure how the hell the US can maintain such deployments...An already strained and exhausted military is going to take another hit.

'Help Wanted' Ad Belies Report on Iraq Security - Claims of increased progress and security are looked at in the face of the fact that the US military is seeing the need to hire ever more mercenaries to fulfill certain roles as US troops go off on combat patrols. This excerpt stuck out:

"With the increased insurgent activity, unit supply personnel must continue to pull force protection along with convoy escort and patrol duties," according to a statement of work that accompanied the Sept. 7 request for bidders from Multi-National Force-Iraq.

Increased insurgent activity!? But I thought things were going better? Apprently insurgents are stepping it up, requiring more US troops on the patrol, while mercs take care of the base.

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Speaking of al-Anbar Province, apparently the Administration is so happy with the "progress" so far in Sunni areas [read the first half of this post], that they wish to 'expand Anbar model to Iraq Shiites

Fueling different sides of a civil war, and undercutting the central government by fostering and promoting independent Shia forces independent of the Shia-controlled central government.

What's more there is danger to this strategy because of how divided the Shia parts of Iraq are becoming:

On Septmeber 15, powerful Shia militant leader Muqtada al-Sadr withdrew his support for the Iraq government and dealing a blow to the political process and the viability of the central government.

And, security has taken a 'turn for the worst' in the Southern Shia areas -

Security is deteriorating in southern Iraq as rival Shiite militias vying for power have stepped up their attacks after moving out of Baghdad to avoid U.S.-led military operations, according to the latest quarterly Pentagon report on Iraq released yesterday.

"The security environment in southern Iraq took a notable turn for the worse in August" with the assassination of two governors, said the report, which covers June through August. "There may be retaliation and an increase in intra-Shi'a violence throughout the South," it said, whereas previously the violence was centered in the main southern city of Basra.

Even Shias are beginning to fight amonst themselves. Which leaves us to this question: Which Shias are we going to support in our expansion of the Anbar model?

You see how complicated this is getting? Because certain groups like Al-Sadr's are very nationalistic and very anti-American. Could we expect increasing intra-sectarian violence? Tread carefully...

The growing violence in the south is one factor making it unlikely that Iraq's leaders -- hampered by a "zero sum" mentality -- will make headway in the fall on key political resolutions, the report concluded. "In the short term, Iraqi political leaders will likely be less concerned about reconciliation than with consolidating power and posturing for a future power struggle," it said.

This Pentagon report, different from the Petraeus report of Sept. 10, is a lot more pessimistic about the security situation and the political progress that the surge was supposed enable. [I will add that a its sectarian violence figures is based on the same methodology as the Petraeus report so I'm still skeptical about its violence figures]

And note the last sentence about how Iraqi political leaders are less concerned with reconciliation than with consolidating power for a future power struggle. Progress will only come from the political process, not the military. Political progress will help the security situation, not the other way around.

It's clear that Iraqi political leaders are not interested (or at least not expecting) in political progress because they know what's coming: The future power struggle. The Iraqi politicians are preparing for what the Administration still fails to acknowledge as inevitable: The civil war.

If they are planning for civil war, if they are not interested in reconciliation then what is left? If there is no reconciliation there is only conflict.

Like I said earlier, I don't BS you. If I say that I think civil war is inevitable, it's because I see some indications for it (like this one) that tell me that the opposing parties are not interested in having a political reconciliation...and that leaves only one choice...

So long folks, I'll be back from Chicago on Sunday. A vacation from news might do me some good.