Is Amnesty for Iraqi insurgents bad?

I've read criticism, including criticism from Democrats and some in the liberal blogosphere (I have no idea about the conservative blogosphere) about giving Iraqi insurgents, particularly those who have taken part in attacking or killing US Soldiers, amnesty. I can understand the sentiment: why should we allow people who have attacked or killed our precious own to go free in a new Iraq?

My view is that we have to be pragmatic about this; the point is to ensure that most of the insurgency will find incentive to give up their fighting and enter the political process. In no way would I support amnesty for groups other than the homegrown Iraqi insurgency (the non-al-Qaeda). But if we stipulate that only insurgents who have never attacked Americans are eligible, how many insurgents would really be brough into the political fold? In effect, those most likely and known to have committed acts of violence will continue to be outside the political process and will likely continue to commit acts of violence.

I'm not saying amnesty must be given for the Iraqi's to succeed but I'm not against such a thing per se.

Algeria is a model for Iraqi amnesty according to some, but its effectiveness, pitfalls, and trackrecord are not exactly all that great as the following Times article on Algerian amnesty makes clear:

But interviews with dozens of people affected by Algeria's approach suggest that its amnesty program is less a model than a cautionary tale. Few are happy, and the fighting is not over. Dozens of people are dying monthly, according to journalists here who follow the killing. "We've reached a dangerous point when the criminals are out of prison and the people who don't agree with it are arrested," said Cherifa Kheddar, whose brother and sister were killed by Islamic extremists in 1996.

The Algerian Amnesty model is spelled out further down:

The Algerian approach is this: a national reconciliation law, approved by referendum in September and promulgated in March, set thousands of convicted Islamist fighters free while ordering silence from their victims. The law shelters government death squads from prosecution. It provides money to some Islamist fighters to help them start new lives and even seeks to expunge the word terrorist from the national discourse. The people who cut throats and those whose throats were cut are now referred to as "victims of the national tragedy."

The article is a must read. It explains how Algerian victims of the AIG are not happy with what they feel is giving "impunity even to those who have kiled hundreds of times" plus the fact that they are discouraged from talking about it. Militants are not happy because they feel true reconsiliation and old wounds wil not be healed without a "real political settlement" (not defined). Or else they believe that "the tensions that led to the violence would build once again."

What this instructive example may mean for Iraq is that, amnesty will not solve the problems of Iraq if the sectarian conflicts that dominate Iraq continue to exist. And this sectarian conflict will endure irregardless if the US leaves today or a year from now or 2 years from now. The political process is the only way but how exactly do you get the different sectarian groups to work exclusively in the political realm? And how do you get insurgents in the political process without amnesty?

I certaintly don't know, hopefully someone does...

Update: Insurgents offer to end attacks if US leaves by '08

The groups who’ve made contact have largely shunned attacks on Iraqi civilians, focusing instead on the U.S.-led coalition forces. Their offer coincides with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s decision to reach out to the Sunni insurgency with a reconciliation plan that includes an amnesty for fighters.....

Naseer al-Ani, a Sunni Arab politician and official with the largest Sunni political group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, said that al-Maliki should encourage the process by guaranteeing security for those making the offer and not immediately reject their demands. “The government should prove its goodwill and not establish red lines,” al-Ani said. “If the initiative is implemented in a good way, 70 percent of the insurgent groups will respond positively.” Al-Maliki, in televised remarks Wednesday, did not issue an outright rejection of the timetable demand. But he said it was unrealistic, because he could not be certain when the Iraqi army and police would be strong enough to make a foreign presence unnecessary for Iraq’s security.