My Thoughts on Iraq - Why We Must Stay

I've been thinking much about this very unpopular war lately...And I've come to a point in my thinking where I know I will be at some odds with many in the liberal blogosphere, as well as in some opposition to a majority of the American people. Before I explain that, let me make a few things clear for people.

I think the decision to invade Iraq was a horrible, horrible mistake. I believe that it was done without the evidence necessary to prove a WMD case, I never believed any of the "diplomacy" before the war was anything but the political equivalent of saying "gee gosh, I tried, I really did. Oh well now I have to go to war." I was against the invasion before the invasion began. The war has been a disaster to the US:

It has sapped billion of dollars from our Treasury, it has done much damage to our military and makes responding to threats elsewhere that much harder -- and makes any threats of force (a tool in statecraft) lack that much more credibility; We are bogged down, who believes we could launch another major invasion of anything? (Iran knows that)

What's more, it is clear that the planners and boosters where incompetent dolts who ran under false assumption such as "it will be easy, they will greet us as liberators" leading them to assume they would be in and out within months. That, in turn assured very little "Phase IV" (post-war/occupation) planning prior to the invasion, which in turn contributing to the horrible chaos and lack of progress that provided the perfect environment for an insurgency to grow in.

Further military tactical failures (emphasizing getting tough with Iraqis, intimidation, mass round-ups, detainee abuse and humiliation, as well as heavy use of conventional tactics) that eschewed classical counterinsurgency tactics to win Iraqi hearts and minds -- the goal of counterinsurgency -- in favor of "getting tough." The US has not changed its tactics until recently, allowing the insurgents to grow and for instability to increase for years.

The situation is pretty well messed up now and we know the people to blame.

With all that said, I've come to a point in my thinking where I am not really convinced that a immediate withdrawal nor a withdrawal within a year (or two) is a wise idea.

We have lost much through our invasion of Iraq, but we stand to damage ourselves, and the region a whole lot more by leaving Iraq before we can insure the Iraqi democracy can handle itself, and ensure that:

1) Iraq not remain a terrorist haven
2) Iraq not stabilize into civil war that could turn regional, with Sunni Arab nations fighting off their own energized Shia populations, a conflict that could involved Sunni nations and Shia nations such as Iran (at least through proxies).

Iraq had nothing to do with Al Qaeda, nor did it have anything to do with 9/11 or the war on terror. In fact, the invasion has created a new Afghanistan -- a new terrorist training ground and haven that did not exist in Iraq prior to the invasion and occupation. But that's the problem, while it wasn't a terrorist haven before, now it is. We cannot turn our back and allow terrorist to keep Iraq as their new Afghanistan. We cannot allow Iraq to continue down the path of failed states.

Whether we like it or not (and I don't), when we invaded Iraq we essentially invoked the Pottery Barn Rule that Colin Powell talked of:

--If you break it, you bought it--

If the US leaves, there will be civil war, Iraq will maintain a haven for terrorist, and it will come back to haunt us. There is so much that can go wrong, so many bad things that can happen if we leave. The problem is, things are not so peachy now. Its low-grade civil war now and the only thing that keeps the nation from going over the precipice is the US, and even then it might do so anyways.

If you are honest to your selves, and for those wanting withdrawal, ask yourselves:

Do you believe the US is better off with Iraq in full civil war, and/or as a terror haven, and/or a regional war sparked by the Sunni/Shia fighting in Iraq?

We may be better off in the short-term with the return of our soldiers, and cutting off the bleeding of US funds on occupation, but in the long-term I believe we would be worse off.

I want to be clear: I am not proposing "Staying the Course," it is precisely that course that has lead us down to the situation that we are in today. It is that "course" which has fed the insurgency, humiliated Iraqis, and turned them towards the insurgency. Like I've said before many times: Heavy handed tactics, abuse, humiliation, disproportional force -- it all serves to move Iraqis further down the recruitment pipeline. And insurgencies die without that continued flow of recruits and support.

What Do I Mean By Staying in Iraq, But Not "Staying the Course?"

What I want is for American tactics to change, for them to abide closely by counterinsurgency tactics: To win hearts and minds. A counterinsurgency tract means you:

1)Educate your troops to be culturally sensitive, taking such issues as the centrality of Honor in Arab society into account. This means, no mass round-ups, it means treating ALL prisoners or detainees with the utmost respect because as Thomas E. Rick (author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq) tells us:

"One of the keys to winning a counterinsurgency is to treat prisoners well because today's captive, if persuaded to enter politics, may become tomorrow's mayor or city council member."

I might add that, if innocent usually fence sitting Iraqis are detained but treated well and released if there is mistake, there is a lowered probability of them turning towards the insurgency. This means that when going into the houses of Iraqis, not to break things, not to point weapons at family, not using relatives as hostages, and not humiliate the head of the family in front of his children and wife, for which he would be required to regain his honor by taking arms against the US.

Its not an easy proposition, and it is exponentially more difficult now, so late in the occupation, than it would have been if done from the get go.

2) It means using more deliberate force that minimizes the amount of civilians getting hurt or killed. It means minimizing the destruction of properties. It means being educated enough to know that the insurgency and the occupation are after the same thing, the support of the Iraqi people. The insurgency will try and goad US soldiers (by firing from within crowds, using provocateurs in civilian demonstrations or events) to shoot at civilians. A good counterinsurgency does not let itself be goaded into undercutting its mission to win the Iraqi people.

3) US Troops must not live away from the people, locked away in large bases apart from the Iraqi people. It must eschew stationing troops in large bases and base them in smaller bases among the people, throughout occupied areas. To pick up and absorb the culture more, for the Iraqis and Americans to interact better, and to make it harder for insurgents to defend against US forces, by allowing a US response to come from multiple directions, as opposed from a well know, well defined direction (roads leading from a big base) which the insurgency will be prepared for. Such an arrangement would also make the planting of IED's much harder to accomplish for insurgents.

4) It must do a better job in training Iraqi forces; Using Special Forces Officers to train Iraqis as opposed to using regular troops, contractors, or guard units. Special Forces troops are taught to be culturally sensitive and knowledgeable because their missions by their natures involves more interaction with foreign languages and cultures. They are specialist in training foreign militias and armies and will produce better quality troops.

5) If the above is handled correctly, the task of reconstruction projects will become much easier, but the security situation must be better. If handled correctly the security situation will improve in these towns, projects will be possible and the US should invest heavily in those projects. As the Iraqis in other villages and towns see the improvements in security and infrastructure in these towns due to new US tactics, there will no doubt be more cooperation for US efforts in their other towns. The US will gain the support of more of the Iraqi people at the expense of the insurgency. The more the people support the US efforts, the harder it is for the insurgency to continue resisting the US occupation.

These are but a few ways to run a counterinsurgency. Even then success is never assured, but I believe we do owe it to Iraq to fix the mistakes we ourselves have helped cause. We also owe it to ourselves and our safety and wellbeing not to allow Iraq to remain a terror haven, to keep it from turning into a failed state, and to prevent further regional instability that a US pulled of Iraq would bring. Such an outcome could be disastrous for us and the whole world.

Editors Note: From here on out, postings of this blog will likely become less and less frequent as I begin classes on Tuesday Aug. 29. This promises to be one of the hardest, most intense semesters to date -- and likely my last semester before I graduate. This semester will be no joke. I'll still try and post at least twice a week though.

I hope what I wrote made people think. I know there will be some disagreement but if it made someone think than I will have no regrets in spending so much time and thought putting this post together.

Peace